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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in hardware security have led to the development
of FANCI (Functional Analysis for Nearly-Unused Circuit Iden-
tification), an analysis tool that identifies stealthy, malicious cir-
cuits within hardware designs that can perform malicious backdoor
behavior. Evaluations of such tools against benchmarks and aca-
demic attacks are not always equivalent to the dynamic attack sce-
narios that can arise in the real world. For this reason, we apply a
red team/blue team approach to stress-test FANCI’s abilities to effi-
ciently detect malicious backdoor circuits within hardware designs.
In the Embedded Systems Challenge (ESC) 2013, teams from
research groups from multiple continents created designs with ma-
licious backdoors hidden in them as part of a red team effort to
circumvent FANCI. Notably, these backdoors were not placed into
a priori known designs. The red team was allowed to create ar-
bitrary, unspecified designs. Two interesting results came out of
this effort. The first was that FANCI was surprisingly resilient to
this wide variety of attacks and was not circumvented by any of
the stealthy backdoors created by the red teams. The second result
is that frequent-action backdoors, which are backdoors that are not
made stealthy, were often successful. These results emphasize the
importance of combining FANCI with a reasonable degree of vali-
dation testing. The blue team efforts also exposed some aspects of
the FANCI prototype that make analysis time-consuming in some
cases, which motivates further development of the prototype in the
future.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
B.6.2 [Hardware]: Logic Design—Security and Trust
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Hardware security and trust is a subject of rapidly increasing
global concern [1, 2, 3, 4]. The economic drive for newer and better
computing technology demands global cooperation and the sharing
of intellectual property. However, as third-party IP is increasingly
used by technology companies, major trust issues exists [5, 6, 7]. A
single malicious circuit, often called a backdoor or trojan, hidden
in hardware design IP, can have catastrophic effects [8, 9].
Recently, static analysis was proposed as a method for combat-
ing third-party IP backdoors. A tool called FANCI (Functional
Analysis for Nearly-Unused Circuit Identification) was developed
that specifically targets a large class of backdoors in digital designs,
called stealthy backdoors [10].
FANCI has performed extremely well on academic designs and
benchmarks, but the current set of benchmarks is limited. As fur-
ther evaluation, we present in this paper a red team/blue team ap-
proach to stress-testing FANCI. In this approach, a variety of red
teams design different backdoors, to stress FANCI’s abilities, both
for the types of attacks it was designed to stop and for alternative
types of attacks. Our blue team applied the FANCI tool to the red
teams’ designs and applied minimal manual analysis (about one
hour per design) to attempt to track down the backdoor in each de-
sign.
The goal of this type of red team/blue team approach is to both
stress-test the tool to see if it achieves everything the implemented
algorithm should achieve and to violate different axioms of the sys-
tem to see how the tool responds to new types of attacks. This was
all performed as part of the 2014 Embedded Systems Challenge
(ESC). We discuss the results and our observations, as well as com-
ments on future directions for functional analysis-based security.
2. OVERVIEWOFBLUETEAMMETHODS
Our blue team used the recently proposed FANCI [10]. This tool
is a prototype, semi-complete version of a new algorithm for de-
tecting any and all stealthy logic with a digital hardware design or
gatelist. The idea behind FANCI is the following. An organization
wants to acquire a third-party hardware design, either as source
code or a gatelist. Some degree of validation and/or verification
will be applied to the produced design to make sure that it matches
or is at least similar to that specification. A malicious provider may
include backdoors in this third-party design, but by necessity the
design is likely to be similar to the true specification. Thus, the
added backdoor circuitry is likely to be stealthy, i.e., largely un-
used. It may not be the case that all stealthy circuits are malicious,
but it is usually the case that all malicious circuits are stealthy (this
Algorithm 1 Compute Control Value
1: count← 0
2: c← Column(w1)
3: T ← TruthTable(w2)
4: for all Rows r in T do
5: x0 ← Value of w2 for c = 0
6: x1 ← Value of w2 for c = 1






observation is supported by analysis of hardware benchmarks) [10].
Thus, FANCI has been designed as a tool that identifies all stealthy
circuits within a design. Once this has been done, we have a set
of stealthy circuits which should be a superset of the set of mali-
cious circuits. There can be false positives within that set, but if the
tool works correctly there should not be false negatives. This is the
principle idea behind FANCI.
FANCI works by detecting stealthy circuits by finding circuits
that do not often impact other wires they are connected to. We call
these wires weakly-affecting, because they drive values into other
wires but do not often change the digital results or outputs of those
wires. We quantitatively measure the degree of impact one wire
has on other using a novel metric called control value. The control
value of an input w1 on an output w2 quantifies how much the truth
table representing the computation of w2 is influenced by the input
column corresponding to w1. Specifically, control value is a num-
ber between zero and one quantifying what fraction of the rows in
the truth table for a circuit are directly influenced by w1. Impor-
tantly, this is independent of particular tests inputs that might be
supplied during validation. The algorithm to compute the control
value ofw1 onw2 is presented as Algorithm 1. We note that in step
3, we do not actually construct the exponentially large truth table.
We instead construct the corresponding boolean function. Since
the sizes of truth tables grow exponentially, we approximate con-
trol values in practice by only evaluating a constant-sized subset of
the rows in the truth table.
Once we have computed all of the control values for a given wire
(a wire here means an output of any internal gate), we have a vector
of floating point values that we can combine to make a judgement
about stealth. We have found that using simple aggregating heuris-
tics are effective for identifying stealthy wires. For ESC, we focus
on two metrics. The first is simply the arithmetic mean, which is
helpful usually for detecting wires that are part of the trigger. The
other metric is called triviality and tends to be helpful in detect-
ing payload wires. Triviality is described in full in [10] but can be
thought of simply as the measure of how often the output is equal
to zero (or by symmetry one). For example, a circuit that always
outputs zero is completely trivial, while a circuit that outputs zero
in half of cases is more benign. Other aggregation metrics may be
able to achieve even better results in the future. Our overall algo-
rithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
For an example of a backdoor circuit and how FANCI detects it,
consider a classic ‘ticking timebomb’ trigger. A backdoor is de-
signed to go off after 240 cycles of operation. This is implemented
with a 40-bit counter and a comparator against the hard-coded value
2
40 − 1. The triviality of the output of the comparator would be
1
240
. When looking at the payload circuit, it would have all 40 in-
put wires from the counter as inputs, meaning its vector of control
Algorithm 2 How FANCI Flag Suspicious Wires in a Design
1: for all modules m do
2: for all gates g inm do
3: for all output wires w of g do
4: T ← TruthTable(FanInTree(w))
5: V ← Empty vector of control values
6: for all columns c in T do
7: Compute control of c
8: Add control(c) to vector V
9: end for
10: Compute heuristics for V






































































































Figure 1: The steps involved in the contest, including both red
team and blue team actions.
values would contain 40 low values, making the median value 1
240
.
In this case, both the trigger and payload circuits are caught due to
the stealthy nature of the triggering logic.
3. REDTEAMMETHODSANDCOMPETI-
TION RULES
We outline the rules of the contest. Since the goal of the contest
was to attack FANCI at its axioms, in the end we allowed most of
the original rules to be broken. The main rule that we did not al-
low to be broken was that all attacks had to be digitally defined in
the design. This means that we did not process any analog logic or
allow for backdoors that require environmental or physical factors
to turn on. We also only processed Verilog code, although adapting
the FANCI tool for VHDL or Bluespec would be possible. Each
submitted design contained exactly one backdoor. The blue team
was given roughly three days to process and analyze the submis-
sions. The flow of the contest is depicted in Figure 1.
The original rules were that a submission should include a sin-
gle module with 10,000 or less gates, including both source code
and gatelist, using only standard logical gates and flip flops, as
well as documentation of the module’s specification. We ended
up making a variety of exceptions, including 1) designs larger than
10,000 gates, 2) designs composed of many modules, 3) designs
lacking source code, 4) designs lacking specification, 5) backdoors
that rely on non-standard clock/reset usage, and 6) designs that use
non-standard flip flops.
One aspect of this contest that was unique was that red teams
were allowed to choose or create their own baseline designs. They
were not forced to insert backdoors into previously existing de-
signs. This added an interesting dimension to the blue team analy-
sis, because some of the designs being analyzed had not been seen
before, and some of those were also without source code. The red
teams did not intentionally obfuscate their gatelists, which is a di-
rection that might be interesting in the future. Code obfuscation
should not impact FANCI, since the tool ignores wire names, but
it would add difficulty to the manual analysis of the results that
ultimately must happen.
Red teams were given points for backdoors that went undetected.
They received more points for more stealthy backdoors, ranging
from one point (for always or frequently on backdoors) to five
points (for backdoors stealthy enough to go unnoticed even by high
quality validation testing). The winners of the contest were deter-
mined by a panel of judges based on the score and how interesting
the design choices were.
4. RESULTSANDEFFICACYOFBLUETEAM
ANALYSIS
The results of the blue team analysis were overall better than ex-
pected. While many of FANCI’s axioms were targeted by attacks,
FANCI still held up quite well. All highly stealthy attacks were
detected with relative ease. We found overall that the best way to
go after FANCI in this contest was to either use a frequently-on (or
always-on) backdoor or to use a ‘pathological pipeline.’1 These are
the two cases where a backdoor is likely to bypass FANCI. In the
first case, frequently-on backdoors are not stealthy. Hence, FANCI
will not flag them as such. In the second case, extreme pipelining
makes it harder to understand the data and stress-tests those por-
tions of the tool prototype that are least developed. We include
further details for the three red teams that were deemed the best by
the judges.
• Red Team A: Red Team A created three backdoors, which high-
light different aspects of the FANCI tool and algorithm. They cre-
ated two frequent-action backdoors (which were not detected) and
one stealthy backdoor (which was detected). The stealthy backdoor
uses a 66-bit cheat code that comes from a pseudo-random input
source. This backdoor highlights the importance of using interme-
diate wires, which was one of the main contributions of FANCI.
If FANCI only computed the impact of module inputs on module
outputs, this type of backdoor might not be caught, but since we an-
alyze all intermediate wires, noticing a 66-input AND gate is easy.
The other two backdoors were frequent-action backdoors that are
nearly-always on. One is turned on by the reset signal, and one is
turned on only during the negative clock edge. Both of these are
frequently enough on that they have no low control values and are
not stealthy (and thus undetectable). These are types of backdoors
that highlight the need to still use minimal validation testing in ad-
dition to FANCI. They also illuminate the fact that signals like reset
and the clock, which might be given less attention during validation
testing, are still relevant, especially when dealing with an adversary
(as opposed to simply looking for unintentional bugs).
• Red Team B: Red Team B submitted three backdoors, one that
we evaluated for the contest and two that we looked at post-competition
due to logistical constraints. This team produced a variety of back-
doors on independent baseline designs. The first backdoor was de-
signed into a DES accelerator and was built off of an aggregation of
finite state machines (FSMs), somewhat similar to UCONN’s ap-
proach2. They used the state machines to control round scheduling
and thus weaken the strength of encryption, which would expose
the ciphertext to software-based attacks upon release. This was a
case where we were able to detect the trigger circuit because of the
combinational logic that controls the state machines, though we
note that this backdoor took more manual analysis to track down
1Pathological pipeline is the term used in the original FANCI pa-
per [10] to describe backdoor triggers that rely on heavy pipelining
to prevent significant stretches of combinational logic from exist-
ing. These backdoors may also be referred to as FSM-heavy.
2UCONN did not win the contest but did construct an FSM-based,
heavily pipelined backdoor that took a long time to find. The vari-
ous teams worked independently and simultaneously.
Figure 2: Trade-off between lines of code analyzed and run-
time. The black points denote designs that finished completely
in the contest time frame. The lighter points represent designs
that were analyzed partially for the contest. For those points,
the full runtime is estimated.
than any of the other ones we detected.
The second backdoor was a similar round-scheduling attack, this
time on XTEA. This one acquires its stealth by counting the num-
ber of one-bits in the input, which is a good way to generate high
stealth. However, the combinational circuit for doing the counting
was flagged. The third backdoor also attacked crypto hardware,
this time a cellular automata PRNG. This one was a sequence cheat
code where the user supplies one bit of the trigger at a time. This
attack would be extra hard for validation to catch, because it hides
on the negative edge of the clock (similar to one of the Red Team
A attacks). However, since FANCI ignores clock timing, it can de-
tect the trigger logic. Making this attack more frequently on might
be more effective against both FANCI and validation tests if the
validation team is known to not check negative clock edges.
• Red Team C: Red Team C produced a backdoor in a stream ci-
pher module. This attack is essentially one of the ones suggested in
the original FANCI paper [10] and highlights the need for basic val-
idation and oversight when applying FANCI. The attack is a com-
bination of a frequent-action backdoor and a pathological pipeline
backdoor. The trigger fires frequently but not always, meaning the
stealth scores are not particularly low. The design is also heavily
pipelined, with roughly one flip flop between each pair of com-
plex logic gates for critical portions of the design. Looking at the
gatelist, it is immediately obvious that the design has been compro-
mised, but identifying what the exact backdoor payload is can be
quite hard, and FANCI does not detect this type of attack. As men-
tioned in the original paper, going after this type of attack requires
either validation tests or oversight from an integration engineer.
5. OBSERVATIONS ON RESULTS
Figure 3: The types of backdoors implemented by the red
teams.
We include a few observations and takeaways based on the re-
sults of the contest and our experiences.
• Runtime and Scability Figure 2 shows the runtime of the tool
as a function of the number of lines of code in the various designs,
using one primary design from each red team. Naturally, FANCI
runs slower on larger designs, but the slowdown is more or less
linear, which makes the analysis feasible. These tests were done on
a single core of a commodity machine.
• Attack Categorization: A positive result of the contest was the
discovery that many of the red teams designed attacks very similar
to the types we anticipated when first designing FANCI. In [10], we
mentioned three general attack avenues against FANCI: frequently
active (non-stealthy) backdoors, heavily pipelined backdoors, and
false positive flooding. While the third option was not employed
by the red teams, the first two were used by multiple teams. The
breakdown is shown in Figure 3. This evidence supports that a
more formal taxonomy could be derived from this survey. Addi-
tionally, it supports our belief that FANCI and validation testing
should to be used together synergistically. Ideally, validation test-
ing should be designed with the assumption that FANCI will detect
anything stealthy. This would allow validation teams to focus their
efforts on other avenues, such as some of the attacks we saw that
target reset or the negative clock edge. Figure 4 shows the over-
all breakdown by red team and also divides the frequently active
backdoors from the stealthy backdoors. While FANCI caught all
the stealthy backdoors, it caught only a few of the frequently active
ones.
Figure 4: Overview of red team attacks and blue team results.
• Algorithm vs. Implementation: While the contest did not ex-
pose any deficiencies in the FANCI algorithm, the tool itself was
stressed in some cases. Two issues stand out. First, runtime be-
came an issue for large designs. Some modules would have taken
more than the given three days to analyze, and so incomplete anal-
ysis runs were done. The tool is configurable for this, allowing
for hasty passes. However, in the future, parallelization could do
a much better job of alleviating this problem. The second issue is
the way the tool handles pipelining. The core of the tool works on
combinational logic, so flip-flops have to be dealt with. We believe
the best way to handle flip-flops is to treat them as identity gates, so
that simply inserting dummy flip-flops does not hide stealthy logic.
On the other hand, this creates loops in the logic, which have to
be dealt with. For most cases, our tool currently treats flip-flops as
a barrier and does not analyze past them. This did not prevent us
from catching any stealthy backdoors in this contest, but it made
manual analysis more difficult. Improving the tool for this case
would be beneficial.
• Primary Takeaways: The primary takeaways from the contest
appear to be that FANCI handles a wide variety of backdoors and
that effort should be spend on improving the usability of the proto-
type and on making static analysis and validation testing a tandem
for future designs.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The ability to identify and understand hardware backdoors dur-
ing the design phase using static analysis is critical for allowing
continued use of third-party hardware intellectual property. Using
a red team/blue team approach, we stress-tested FANCI, a state-
of-the-art tool for identifying stealthy backdoors. Using this ap-
proach, we saw examples of stealthy attacks designed to target
FANCI specifically, as well as examples of non-stealthy backdoors.
Overall, the results of the contest were promising, as they demon-
strated the effectiveness and flexibility of the FANCI approach.
However, the results continue to highlight the importance of secu-
rity awareness when integrating hardware designs, including FANCI,
validation testing, and reasonable oversight.
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